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It has been proved that the independent monetary policy will be severely 
undermined in a world of dependence. In the old story, a changed policy in one country 
means little to another under the hypothesis of little countries, what has underlined in 
this free competition ideas is that the "separation of powers" is the optimal policy choice. 
However, what will happen when we consider the "big powers"? The effect of the 
policy carried out in one country will surpass the border of the country to other 
countries. The interdependence between economies leads to the interdependence of the 
policies. Therefore, the need for coordination between international monetary policies 
comes out on our schedule.  
‘Cooper effects’ and ‘Hamada image’ are models for international policy 
coordination. On the theory, the potential benefits of International coordination are 
undeniable. However, empirical results are inconsistent. Obviously, there is something 
impeding the effect of international coordination. This thesis deals with this problem 
and contends that the traditional international policy co-ordinations (fixed exchange rate 
system, information exchange, International Conference) haven’t lived up to our 
expectation largely due to the issue of sustainability, a number of political factors and 
asymmetrical problems. 
As the second part of the paper, in chapter 3 the author recommended monetary 
union for a means to solve these problems. In the text the author proved the advantages 
of monetary union from various aspects such as the spillover effect, credibility and 
asymmetrical impact. Meantime, for the sake of integrity, the author also introduced in 
this part the standards of currency union and necessary cost-benefit analysis. 
Among the third part of the thesis, the author made a simple test on European 
Monetary Union, thereafter came to the conclusion that the euro zone is a good 
monetary union. When it comes to East Asia, we held that this area has not prepared 














namely ‘step-by-step road map’ for East Asia. Of course, what we need to emphasize is 
that our ultimate aim is to set up in East Asia a monetary union similar to the euro zone. 
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技巧建立了大规模多国模型(Large Scale Multi-country Model)对主要工业国家的宏
观经济政策协调的获益情况进行了定量分析，结论是各国通过国际协调而得到的
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